spam
Spam: unsolicited bulk email: filtering, reporting, reputation
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spam subjects:
- DNSBL3 RFCs
spam RFCs (26)
RFC 7070: An Architecture for Reputation Reporting
Proposed Standard- N. Borenstein
- M. Kucherawy
- November 2013
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This document describes a general architecture for a reputation-based service, allowing one to request reputation-related data over the Internet, where "reputation" refers to predictions or expectations about an entity or an identifier such as a domain name. The document roughly follows the recommendations of RFC 4101 for describing a protocol model.
Abstract
This document describes a general architecture for a reputation-based service, allowing one to request reputation-related data over the Internet, where "reputation" refers to predictions or expectations about an entity or an identifier such as a domain name. The document roughly follows the recommendations of RFC 4101 for describing a protocol model.
RFC 7071: A Media Type for Reputation Interchange
Proposed Standard- N. Borenstein
- M. Kucherawy
- November 2013
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This document defines the format of reputation response data ("reputons"), the media type for packaging it, and definition of a registry for the names of reputation applications and response sets.
Abstract
This document defines the format of reputation response data ("reputons"), the media type for packaging it, and definition of a registry for the names of reputation applications and response sets.
RFC 7072: A Reputation Query Protocol
Proposed Standard- N. Borenstein
- M. Kucherawy
- November 2013
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This document defines a mechanism to conduct queries for reputation information over the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as the payload meta-format.
Abstract
This document defines a mechanism to conduct queries for reputation information over the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as the payload meta-format.
RFC 7073: A Reputation Response Set for Email Identifiers
Proposed Standard- N. Borenstein
- M. Kucherawy
- November 2013
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This document defines a response set for describing assertions a reputation service provider can make about email identifiers, for use in generating reputons.
Abstract
This document defines a response set for describing assertions a reputation service provider can make about email identifiers, for use in generating reputons.
RFC 6692: Source Ports in Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) Reports
Proposed Standard- R. Clayton
- M. Kucherawy
- July 2012
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document defines an additional header field for use in Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) reports to permit the identification of the source port of the connection involved in an abuse incident.
This document updates RFC 6591. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document defines an additional header field for use in Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) reports to permit the identification of the source port of the connection involved in an abuse incident.
This document updates RFC 6591. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 6650: Creation and Use of Email Feedback Reports: An Applicability Statement for the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF)
Proposed Standard- J. Falk
- M. Kucherawy
- June 2012
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
RFC 5965 defines an extensible, machine-readable format intended for mail operators to report feedback about received email to other parties. This applicability statement describes common methods for utilizing this format for reporting both abuse and authentication failure events. Mailbox Providers of any size, mail-sending entities, and end users can use these methods as a basis to create procedures that best suit them. Some related optional mechanisms are also discussed. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
RFC 5965 defines an extensible, machine-readable format intended for mail operators to report feedback about received email to other parties. This applicability statement describes common methods for utilizing this format for reporting both abuse and authentication failure events. Mailbox Providers of any size, mail-sending entities, and end users can use these methods as a basis to create procedures that best suit them. Some related optional mechanisms are also discussed. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 6651: Extensions to DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) for Failure Reporting
Proposed Standard- M. Kucherawy
- June 2012
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This document presents extensions to the DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) specification to allow for detailed reporting of message authentication failures in an on-demand fashion. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document presents extensions to the DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) specification to allow for detailed reporting of message authentication failures in an on-demand fashion. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 6652: Sender Policy Framework (SPF) Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting Format
Proposed Standard- S. Kitterman
- June 2012
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This memo presents extensions to the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) and Sender Policy Framework (SPF) specifications to allow for detailed reporting of message authentication failures in an on-demand fashion.
This memo updates RFC 4408 by providing an IANA registry for SPF modifiers. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This memo presents extensions to the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) and Sender Policy Framework (SPF) specifications to allow for detailed reporting of message authentication failures in an on-demand fashion.
This memo updates RFC 4408 by providing an IANA registry for SPF modifiers. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 6647: Email Greylisting: An Applicability Statement for SMTP
Proposed Standard- M. Kucherawy
- D. Crocker
- June 2012
- IETF publication
- Applications and Real-Time Area
Abstract
This document describes the art of email greylisting, the practice of providing temporarily degraded service to unknown email clients as an anti-abuse mechanism.
Greylisting is an established mechanism deemed essential to the repertoire of current anti-abuse email filtering systems. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document describes the art of email greylisting, the practice of providing temporarily degraded service to unknown email clients as an anti-abuse mechanism.
Greylisting is an established mechanism deemed essential to the repertoire of current anti-abuse email filtering systems. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 6591: Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting Format
Proposed Standard- H. Fontana
- April 2012
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This memo registers an extension report type for the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF), affecting multiple registries, for use in generating receipt-time reports about messages that fail one or more email message authentication checks. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This memo registers an extension report type for the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF), affecting multiple registries, for use in generating receipt-time reports about messages that fail one or more email message authentication checks. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 6590: Redaction of Potentially Sensitive Data from Mail Abuse Reports
Proposed Standard- J. Falk
- M. Kucherawy
- April 2012
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
Email messages often contain information that might be considered private or sensitive, per either regulation or social norms. When such a message becomes the subject of a report intended to be shared with other entities, the report generator may wish to redact or elide the sensitive portions of the message. This memo suggests one method for doing so effectively. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
Email messages often contain information that might be considered private or sensitive, per either regulation or social norms. When such a message becomes the subject of a report intended to be shared with other entities, the report generator may wish to redact or elide the sensitive portions of the message. This memo suggests one method for doing so effectively. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 6561: Recommendations for the Remediation of Bots in ISP Networks
Informational- J. Livingood
- N. Mody
- M. O'Reirdan
- March 2012
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document contains recommendations on how Internet Service Providers can use various remediation techniques to manage the effects of malicious bot infestations on computers used by their subscribers. Internet users with infected computers are exposed to risks such as loss of personal data and increased susceptibility to online fraud. Such computers can also become inadvertent participants in or components of an online crime network, spam network, and/or phishing network as well as be used as a part of a distributed denial-of-service attack. Mitigating the effects of and remediating the installations of malicious bots will make it more difficult for botnets to operate and could reduce the level of online crime on the Internet in general and/or on a particular Internet Service Provider's network. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
Abstract
This document contains recommendations on how Internet Service Providers can use various remediation techniques to manage the effects of malicious bot infestations on computers used by their subscribers. Internet users with infected computers are exposed to risks such as loss of personal data and increased susceptibility to online fraud. Such computers can also become inadvertent participants in or components of an online crime network, spam network, and/or phishing network as well as be used as a part of a distributed denial-of-service attack. Mitigating the effects of and remediating the installations of malicious bots will make it more difficult for botnets to operate and could reduce the level of online crime on the Internet in general and/or on a particular Internet Service Provider's network. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC 6449: Complaint Feedback Loop Operational Recommendations
Informational- J. Falk
- November 2011
- IETF publication
Abstract
Complaint Feedback Loops similar to those described herein have existed for more than a decade, resulting in many de facto standards and best practices. This document is an attempt to codify, and thus clarify, the ways that both providers and consumers of these feedback mechanisms intend to use the feedback, describing some already common industry practices.
This document is the result of cooperative efforts within the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group, a trade organization separate from the IETF. The original MAAWG document upon which this document is based was published in April, 2010. This document does not represent the consensus of the IETF; rather it is being published as an Informational RFC to make it widely available to the Internet community and simplify reference to this material from IETF work. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
Abstract
Complaint Feedback Loops similar to those described herein have existed for more than a decade, resulting in many de facto standards and best practices. This document is an attempt to codify, and thus clarify, the ways that both providers and consumers of these feedback mechanisms intend to use the feedback, describing some already common industry practices.
This document is the result of cooperative efforts within the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group, a trade organization separate from the IETF. The original MAAWG document upon which this document is based was published in April, 2010. This document does not represent the consensus of the IETF; rather it is being published as an Informational RFC to make it widely available to the Internet community and simplify reference to this material from IETF work. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC 6430: Email Feedback Report Type Value: not-spam
Proposed Standard- K. Li
- B. Leiba
- November 2011
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This document defines a new Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) feedback report type value: "not-spam". It can be used to report an email message that was mistakenly marked as spam. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document defines a new Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) feedback report type value: "not-spam". It can be used to report an email message that was mistakenly marked as spam. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 5965: An Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports
Proposed Standard- Y. Shafranovich
- J. Levine
- M. Kucherawy
- August 2010
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This document defines an extensible format and MIME type that may be used by mail operators to report feedback about received email to other parties. This format is intended as a machine-readable replacement for various existing report formats currently used in Internet email. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document defines an extensible format and MIME type that may be used by mail operators to report feedback about received email to other parties. This format is intended as a machine-readable replacement for various existing report formats currently used in Internet email. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 5672: RFC 4871 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures -- Update
Proposed Standard- D. Crocker
- August 2009
- IETF publication
- Applications and Real-Time Area
Abstract
This document updates RFC 4871, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures". Specifically, the document clarifies the nature, roles, and relationship of the two DKIM identifier tag values that are candidates for payload delivery to a receiving processing module. The Update is in the style of an Errata entry, albeit a rather long one. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Obsoleted by RFC 6376
Abstract
This document updates RFC 4871, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures". Specifically, the document clarifies the nature, roles, and relationship of the two DKIM identifier tag values that are candidates for payload delivery to a receiving processing module. The Update is in the style of an Errata entry, albeit a rather long one. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 5429: Sieve Email Filtering: Reject and Extended Reject Extensions
Proposed Standard- A. Stone
- March 2009
- IETF publication
- Applications Area
Abstract
This memo updates the definition of the Sieve mail filtering language "reject" extension, originally defined in RFC 3028.
A "Joe-job" is a spam run forged to appear as though it came from an innocent party, who is then generally flooded by automated bounces, Message Disposition Notifications (MDNs), and personal messages with complaints. The original Sieve "reject" action defined in RFC 3028 required use of MDNs for rejecting messages, thus contributing to the flood of Joe-job spam to victims of Joe-jobs.
This memo updates the definition of the "reject" action to allow messages to be refused during the SMTP transaction, and defines the "ereject" action to require messages to be refused during the SMTP transaction, if possible.
The "ereject" action is intended to replace the "reject" action wherever possible. The "ereject" action is similar to "reject", but will always favor protocol-level message rejection. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This memo updates the definition of the Sieve mail filtering language "reject" extension, originally defined in RFC 3028.
A "Joe-job" is a spam run forged to appear as though it came from an innocent party, who is then generally flooded by automated bounces, Message Disposition Notifications (MDNs), and personal messages with complaints. The original Sieve "reject" action defined in RFC 3028 required use of MDNs for rejecting messages, thus contributing to the flood of Joe-job spam to victims of Joe-jobs.
This memo updates the definition of the "reject" action to allow messages to be refused during the SMTP transaction, and defines the "ereject" action to require messages to be refused during the SMTP transaction, if possible.
The "ereject" action is intended to replace the "reject" action wherever possible. The "ereject" action is similar to "reject", but will always favor protocol-level message rejection. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 5039: The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam
Informational- J. Rosenberg
- C. Jennings
- January 2008
- IETF publication
- Real-time Applications and Infrastructure Area
Abstract
Spam, defined as the transmission of bulk unsolicited messages, has plagued Internet email. Unfortunately, spam is not limited to email. It can affect any system that enables user-to-user communications. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) defines a system for user-to- user multimedia communications. Therefore, it is susceptible to spam, just as email is. In this document, we analyze the problem of spam in SIP. We first identify the ways in which the problem is the same and the ways in which it is different from email. We then examine the various possible solutions that have been discussed for email and consider their applicability to SIP. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Abstract
Spam, defined as the transmission of bulk unsolicited messages, has plagued Internet email. Unfortunately, spam is not limited to email. It can affect any system that enables user-to-user communications. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) defines a system for user-to- user multimedia communications. Therefore, it is susceptible to spam, just as email is. In this document, we analyze the problem of spam in SIP. We first identify the ways in which the problem is the same and the ways in which it is different from email. We then examine the various possible solutions that have been discussed for email and consider their applicability to SIP. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
RFC 5068: BCP 134: Email Submission Operations: Access and Accountability Requirements
Best Current Practice- C. Hutzler
- D. Crocker
- P. Resnick
- E. Allman
- T. Finch
- November 2007
- IETF publication
Abstract
Email has become a popular distribution service for a variety of socially unacceptable, mass-effect purposes. The most obvious ones include spam and worms. This note recommends conventions for the operation of email submission and transport services between independent operators, such as enterprises and Internet Service Providers. Its goal is to improve lines of accountability for controlling abusive uses of the Internet mail service. To this end, this document offers recommendations for constructive operational policies between independent operators of email submission and transmission services.
Email authentication technologies are aimed at providing assurances and traceability between internetworked networks. In many email services, the weakest link in the chain of assurances is initial submission of a message. This document offers recommendations for constructive operational policies for this first step of email sending, the submission (or posting) of email into the transmission network. Relaying and delivery entail policies that occur subsequent to submission and are outside the scope of this document. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Abstract
Email has become a popular distribution service for a variety of socially unacceptable, mass-effect purposes. The most obvious ones include spam and worms. This note recommends conventions for the operation of email submission and transport services between independent operators, such as enterprises and Internet Service Providers. Its goal is to improve lines of accountability for controlling abusive uses of the Internet mail service. To this end, this document offers recommendations for constructive operational policies between independent operators of email submission and transmission services.
Email authentication technologies are aimed at providing assurances and traceability between internetworked networks. In many email services, the weakest link in the chain of assurances is initial submission of a message. This document offers recommendations for constructive operational policies for this first step of email sending, the submission (or posting) of email into the transmission network. Relaying and delivery entail policies that occur subsequent to submission and are outside the scope of this document. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
RFC 4948: Report from the IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006
Informational- L. Andersson
- E. Davies
- L. Zhang
- August 2007
- IAB publication
Abstract
This document reports the outcome of a workshop held by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) on Unwanted Internet Traffic. The workshop was held on March 9-10, 2006 at USC/ISI in Marina del Rey, CA, USA. The primary goal of the workshop was to foster interchange between the operator, standards, and research communities on the topic of unwanted traffic, as manifested in, for example, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, spam, and phishing, to gain understandings on the ultimate sources of these unwanted traffic, and to assess their impact and the effectiveness of existing solutions. It was also a goal of the workshop to identify engineering and research topics that could be undertaken by the IAB, the IETF, the IRTF, and the network research and development community at large to develop effective countermeasures against the unwanted traffic. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Abstract
This document reports the outcome of a workshop held by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) on Unwanted Internet Traffic. The workshop was held on March 9-10, 2006 at USC/ISI in Marina del Rey, CA, USA. The primary goal of the workshop was to foster interchange between the operator, standards, and research communities on the topic of unwanted traffic, as manifested in, for example, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, spam, and phishing, to gain understandings on the ultimate sources of these unwanted traffic, and to assess their impact and the effectiveness of existing solutions. It was also a goal of the workshop to identify engineering and research topics that could be undertaken by the IAB, the IETF, the IRTF, and the network research and development community at large to develop effective countermeasures against the unwanted traffic. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
RFC 4871: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures
Proposed Standard- E. Allman
- J. Callas
- M. Delany
- M. Libbey
- J. Fenton
- M. Thomas
- May 2007
- IETF publication
- Applications and Real-Time Area
Abstract
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a domain-level authentication framework for email using public-key cryptography and key server technology to permit verification of the source and contents of messages by either Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) or Mail User Agents (MUAs). The ultimate goal of this framework is to permit a signing domain to assert responsibility for a message, thus protecting message signer identity and the integrity of the messages they convey while retaining the functionality of Internet email as it is known today. Protection of email identity may assist in the global control of "spam" and "phishing". [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Obsoleted by RFC 6376
Abstract
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a domain-level authentication framework for email using public-key cryptography and key server technology to permit verification of the source and contents of messages by either Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) or Mail User Agents (MUAs). The ultimate goal of this framework is to permit a signing domain to assert responsibility for a message, thus protecting message signer identity and the integrity of the messages they convey while retaining the functionality of Internet email as it is known today. Protection of email identity may assist in the global control of "spam" and "phishing". [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 4405: SMTP Service Extension for Indicating the Responsible Submitter of an E-Mail Message
Historic- E. Allman
- H. Katz
- April 2006
- IETF publication
Abstract
This memo defines an extension to the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) service that allows an SMTP client to specify the responsible submitter of an e-mail message. The responsible submitter is the e-mail address of the entity most recently responsible for introducing a message into the transport stream. This extension helps receiving e-mail servers efficiently determine whether the SMTP client is authorized to transmit mail on behalf of the responsible submitter's domain. This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.
Abstract
This memo defines an extension to the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) service that allows an SMTP client to specify the responsible submitter of an e-mail message. The responsible submitter is the e-mail address of the entity most recently responsible for introducing a message into the transport stream. This extension helps receiving e-mail servers efficiently determine whether the SMTP client is authorized to transmit mail on behalf of the responsible submitter's domain. This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.
RFC 4406: Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail
Historic- J. Lyon
- M. Wong
- April 2006
- IETF publication
Abstract
Internet mail suffers from the fact that much unwanted mail is sent using spoofed addresses -- "spoofed" in this case means that the address is used without the permission of the domain owner. This document describes a family of tests by which SMTP servers can determine whether an e-mail address in a received message was used with the permission of the owner of the domain contained in that e-mail address. This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.
Abstract
Internet mail suffers from the fact that much unwanted mail is sent using spoofed addresses -- "spoofed" in this case means that the address is used without the permission of the domain owner. This document describes a family of tests by which SMTP servers can determine whether an e-mail address in a received message was used with the permission of the owner of the domain contained in that e-mail address. This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.
RFC 3865: A No Soliciting Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Service Extension
Proposed Standard- C. Malamud
- September 2004
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document proposes an extension to Soliciting Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) for an electronic mail equivalent to the real-world "No Soliciting" sign. In addition to the service extension, a new message header and extensions to the existing "received" message header are described. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document proposes an extension to Soliciting Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) for an electronic mail equivalent to the real-world "No Soliciting" sign. In addition to the service extension, a new message header and extensions to the existing "received" message header are described. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 2635: FYI 35: DON'T SPEW A Set of Guidelines for Mass Unsolicited Mailings and Postings (spam*)
Informational- S. Hambridge
- A. Lunde
- June 1999
- IETF publication
- User Services Area
Abstract
This document explains why mass unsolicited electronic mail messages are harmful in the Internetworking community. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Abstract
This document explains why mass unsolicited electronic mail messages are harmful in the Internetworking community. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
RFC 2505: BCP 30: Anti-Spam Recommendations for SMTP MTAs
Best Current Practice- G. Lindberg
- February 1999
- Legacy publication
Abstract
This memo gives a number of implementation recommendations for SMTP, MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents, e.g. sendmail,) to make them more capable of reducing the impact of spam. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Abstract
This memo gives a number of implementation recommendations for SMTP, MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents, e.g. sendmail,) to make them more capable of reducing the impact of spam. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
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