DTLS

For (D)TLS 1.2, this document deprecates the use of two key exchanges, namely Diffie-Hellman (DH) over a finite field and RSA. It also discourages the use of static Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) cipher suites.

These prescriptions apply only to (D)TLS 1.2, since (D)TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated by RFC 8996 and (D)TLS 1.3 either does not use the affected algorithms or does not share the relevant configuration options. (There is no DTLS version 1.1.)

This document updates RFCs 4162, 4279, 4346, 4785, 5246, 5288, 5289, 5469, 5487, 5932, 6209, 6347, 6367, 6655, 7905, 8422, and 9325 to either deprecate or discourage the use of cipher suites using the above key exchange methods in (D)TLS 1.2 connections.

This document specifies an Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ID for Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) services that are secured by DTLS.

This document specifies a Return Routability Check (RRC) subprotocol for use in the context of the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3.

Implementations offering the CID functionality described in RFCs 9146 and 9147 are encouraged to also provide the RRC functionality described in this document. For this reason, this document updates RFCs 9146 and 9147.

This document updates the changes to the TLS and DTLS IANA registries made in RFC 8447. It adds a new value, "D" for discouraged, to the "Recommended" column of the selected TLS registries and adds a "Comment" column to all active registries that do not already have a "Comment" column. Finally, it updates the registration request instructions.

This document updates RFC 8447.

This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) specification to allow manufacturers to define TLS and DTLS profile parameters. This allows a network security service to identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which can indicate the presence of unauthorized software, malware, or security policy-violating traffic on an endpoint.

RFCs 5425 and 6012 describe using TLS and DTLS to securely transport syslog messages. This document updates the cipher suites required by RFC 5245 (TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog) and RFC 6012 (DTLS Transport Mapping for Syslog). It also updates the protocol recommended by RFC 6012 for secure datagram transport.

This document updates RFC 6353 ("Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)") to reflect changes necessary to support Transport Layer Security version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) and Datagram Transport Layer Security version 1.3 (DTLS 1.3), which are jointly known as "(D)TLS 1.3". This document is compatible with (D)TLS 1.2 and is intended to be compatible with future versions of SNMP and (D)TLS.

This document updates the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB as defined in RFC 6353.

The organizational separation between operators of TLS and DTLS endpoints and the certification authority can create limitations. For example, the lifetime of certificates, how they may be used, and the algorithms they support are ultimately determined by the Certification Authority (CA). This document describes a mechanism to overcome some of these limitations by enabling operators to delegate their own credentials for use in TLS and DTLS without breaking compatibility with peers that do not support this specification.

RFC 7983 defines a scheme for a Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) receiver to demultiplex Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) / Secure Real-time Transport Control Protocol (SRTCP), ZRTP, and Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) channel packets arriving on a single port. This document updates RFC 7983 and RFC 5764 to also allow QUIC packets to be multiplexed on a single receiving socket.

This document updates "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)" (RFC 9202) by specifying that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide range of application protocols and can also form the basis for secure transport protocols. Over the years, the industry has witnessed several serious attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This document provides the latest recommendations for ensuring the security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. These recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases.

RFC 7525, an earlier version of the TLS recommendations, was published when the industry was transitioning to TLS 1.2. Years later, this transition is largely complete, and TLS 1.3 is widely available. This document updates the guidance given the new environment and obsoletes RFC 7525. In addition, this document updates RFCs 5288 and 6066 in view of recent attacks.

This specification defines a profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework that allows constrained servers to delegate client authentication and authorization. The protocol relies on DTLS version 1.2 or later for communication security between entities in a constrained network using either raw public keys or pre-shared keys. A resource-constrained server can use this protocol to delegate management of authorization information to a trusted host with less-severe limitations regarding processing power and memory.

This document defines a base profile for TLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3 as well as DTLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3 for use with the US Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite.

The profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of all components of US National Security Systems that use TLS or DTLS. It is also appropriate for all other US Government systems that process high-value information.

The profile is made publicly available here for use by developers and operators of these and any other system deployments.

This document defines a protocol for tunneling DTLS traffic in multimedia conferences that enables a Media Distributor to facilitate key exchange between an endpoint in a conference and the Key Distributor. The protocol is designed to ensure that the keying material used for hop-by-hop encryption and authentication is accessible to the Media Distributor, while the keying material used for end-to-end encryption and authentication is inaccessible to the Media Distributor.

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.

This document obsoletes RFC 6347.

This document specifies the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol version 1.2.

A CID is an identifier carried in the record layer header that gives the recipient additional information for selecting the appropriate security association. In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security association of an incoming DTLS record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple. If the source IP address and/or source port changes during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session, then the receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context.

The new ciphertext record format with the CID also provides content type encryption and record layer padding.

This document updates RFC 6347.

This document specifies enhancements to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) that mitigate security issues in particular use cases. The Echo option enables a CoAP server to verify the freshness of a request or to force a client to demonstrate reachability at its claimed network address. The Request-Tag option allows the CoAP server to match block-wise message fragments belonging to the same request. This document updates RFC 7252 with respect to the following: processing requirements for client Tokens, forbidding non-secure reuse of Tokens to ensure response-to-request binding when CoAP is used with a security protocol, and amplification mitigation (where the use of the Echo option is now recommended).

The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are increasingly vulnerable to attack, and this document deprecates their use in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 with Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), as used in record protection. This document updates RFC 5246.

Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Control Plane should ideally be self-managing and be as independent as possible of configuration. This document defines such a plane and calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane", with the primary use as a control plane for autonomic functions. It also serves as a "virtual out-of-band channel" for Operations, Administration, and Management (OAM) communications over a network that provides automatically configured, hop-by-hop authenticated and encrypted communications via automatically configured IPv6 even when the network is not configured or is misconfigured.

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport protocol used to establish associations between two endpoints. RFC 8261 specifies how SCTP can be used on top of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, which is referred to as SCTP-over-DTLS.

This specification defines the following new Session Description Protocol (SDP) protocol identifiers (proto values): "UDP/DTLS/SCTP" and "TCP/DTLS/SCTP". This specification also specifies how to use the new proto values with the SDP offer/answer mechanism for negotiating SCTP-over-DTLS associations.

This document defines the Session Description Protocol (SDP) offer/answer procedures for negotiating and establishing a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) association. The document also defines the criteria for when a new DTLS association must be established. The document updates RFCs 5763 and 7345 by replacing common SDP offer/answer procedures with a reference to this specification.

This document defines a new SDP media-level attribute, "tls-id".

This document also defines how the "tls-id" attribute can be used for negotiating and establishing a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection, in conjunction with the procedures in RFCs 4145 and 8122.

This document describes unknown key-share attacks on the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security for the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP). Similar attacks are described on the use of DTLS-SRTP with the identity bindings used in Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) and SIP identity. These attacks are difficult to mount, but they cause a victim to be misled about the identity of a communicating peer. This document defines mitigation techniques that implementations of RFC 8122 are encouraged to deploy.

This document defines how to use the WebRTC data channel mechanism to realize a data channel, referred to as a Controlling Multiple Streams for Telepresence (CLUE) data channel, for transporting CLUE protocol messages between two CLUE entities.

Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) and the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that provides for the secure transport of SRTP master keys, rollover counters, and other information within SRTP. This facility enables SRTP for decentralized conferences by distributing a common key to all of the conference endpoints.

The Babel Routing Protocol does not contain any means to authenticate neighbours or provide integrity or confidentiality for messages sent between them. This document specifies a mechanism to ensure these properties using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).

This document defines several new cipher suites for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. These cipher suites are based on the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provide encryption and integrity protection.

This document describes a number of changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries that range from adding notes to the registry all the way to changing the registration policy. These changes were mostly motivated by WG review of the TLS- and DTLS-related registries undertaken as part of the TLS 1.3 development process.

This document updates the following RFCs: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5705, 5878, 6520, and 7301.

This document discusses usage profiles, based on one or more authentication mechanisms, which can be used for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Datagram TLS (DTLS). These profiles can increase the privacy of DNS transactions compared to using only cleartext DNS. This document also specifies new authentication mechanisms -- it describes several ways that a DNS client can use an authentication domain name to authenticate a (D)TLS connection to a DNS server. Additionally, it defines (D)TLS protocol profiles for DNS clients and servers implementing DNS over (D)TLS. This document updates RFC 7858.

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport protocol originally defined to run on top of the network protocols IPv4 or IPv6. This document specifies how SCTP can be used on top of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. Using the encapsulation method described in this document, SCTP is unaware of the protocols being used below DTLS; hence, explicit IP addresses cannot be used in the SCTP control chunks. As a consequence, the SCTP associations carried over DTLS can only be single-homed.

This document defines the use of the ARIA block cipher algorithm within the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP). It details two modes of operation (CTR and GCM) and the SRTP key derivation functions for ARIA. Additionally, this document defines DTLS-SRTP protection profiles and Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) parameter sets for use with ARIA.

This document describes, surveys, and classifies the protocol mechanisms provided by existing IETF protocols, as background for determining a common set of transport services. It examines the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Multipath TCP, the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), UDP-Lite, the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP), the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP), File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport / Asynchronous Layered Coding (FLUTE/ALC) for Reliable Multicast, NACK- Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM), Transport Layer Security (TLS), Datagram TLS (DTLS), and the Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP), when HTTP is used as a pseudotransport. This survey provides background for the definition of transport services within the TAPS working group.

DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path between the DNS client and its server. These queries and responses can contain privacy-sensitive information, which is valuable to protect.

This document proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS, to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks. As latency is critical for DNS, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to reduce DTLS round trips and reduce the DTLS handshake size. The proposed mechanism runs over port 853.

This document defines how Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), RTP Control Protocol (RTCP), Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN), and ZRTP packets are multiplexed on a single receiving socket. It overrides the guidance from RFC 5764 ("SRTP Extension for DTLS"), which suffered from four issues described and fixed in this document.

This document updates RFC 5764.

A common design pattern in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments is the use of a constrained device that collects data via sensors or controls actuators for use in home automation, industrial control systems, smart cities, and other IoT deployments.

This document defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2 profile that offers communications security for this data exchange thereby preventing eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The lack of communication security is a common vulnerability in IoT products that can easily be solved by using these well-researched and widely deployed Internet security protocols.

This document describes the use of the ChaCha stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocols.

This document updates RFCs 5246 and 6347.

Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Back-to-Back User Agents (B2BUAs) exist on the signaling and media paths between the endpoints. This document describes the behavior of B2BUAs when Secure Real-time Transport (SRTP) security context is set up with the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.

This document specifies a means to find authoritative RADIUS servers for a given realm. It is used in conjunction with either RADIUS over Transport Layer Security (RADIUS/TLS) or RADIUS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (RADIUS/DTLS).

Over the last few years, there have been several serious attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS), including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. This document summarizes these attacks, with the goal of motivating generic and protocol-specific recommendations on the usage of TLS and Datagram TLS (DTLS).

This document describes a means of negotiating the use of the encrypt-then-MAC security mechanism in place of the existing MAC-then-encrypt mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). The MAC-then-encrypt mechanism has been the subject of a number of security vulnerabilities over a period of many years.

The RADIUS protocol defined in RFC 2865 has limited support for authentication and encryption of RADIUS packets. The protocol transports data in the clear, although some parts of the packets can have obfuscated content. Packets may be replayed verbatim by an attacker, and client-server authentication is based on fixed shared secrets. This document specifies how the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol may be used as a fix for these problems. It also describes how implementations of this proposal can coexist with current RADIUS systems.

This document specifies the usage of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as a transport protocol for Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN). It provides guidance on when and how to use DTLS with the currently standardized STUN usages. It also specifies modifications to the STUN and Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN) URIs and to the TURN resolution mechanism to facilitate the resolution of STUN and TURN URIs into the IP address and port of STUN and TURN servers supporting DTLS as a transport protocol. This document updates RFCs 5389 and 5928.

This document specifies how the UDP Transport Layer (UDPTL) protocol, the predominant transport protocol for T.38 fax, can be transported over the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, how the usage of UDPTL over DTLS is indicated in the Session Description Protocol (SDP), and how UDPTL over DTLS is negotiated in a session established using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).

This document specifies a new certificate type and two TLS extensions for exchanging raw public keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). The new certificate type allows raw public keys to be used for authentication.

This document describes the Heartbeat Extension for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocols.

The Heartbeat Extension provides a new protocol for TLS/DTLS allowing the usage of keep-alive functionality without performing a renegotiation and a basis for path MTU (PMTU) discovery for DTLS. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes a mechanism for using additional master secret inputs with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram TLS (DTLS). This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.

This document describes a Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), that uses either the Transport Layer Security protocol or the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The TLS and DTLS protocols provide authentication and privacy services for SNMP applications. This document describes how the TLS Transport Model (TLSTM) implements the needed features of an SNMP Transport Subsystem to make this protection possible in an interoperable way.

This Transport Model is designed to meet the security and operational needs of network administrators. It supports the sending of SNMP messages over TLS/TCP and DTLS/UDP. The TLS mode can make use of TCP's improved support for larger packet sizes and the DTLS mode provides potentially superior operation in environments where a connectionless (e.g., UDP) transport is preferred. Both TLS and DTLS integrate well into existing public keying infrastructures.

This document also defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols. In particular, it defines objects for managing the TLS Transport Model for SNMP. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP).

DTLS over SCTP provides communications privacy for applications that use SCTP as their transport protocol and allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery.

Applications using DTLS over SCTP can use almost all transport features provided by SCTP and its extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

The General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) protocol currently uses TCP or Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP for Connection mode operation. This document describes the usage of GIST over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.

This document describes the transport of syslog messages over the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. It provides a secure transport for syslog messages in cases where a connectionless transport is desired.

This document specifies how to use the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to establish a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) security context using the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. It describes a mechanism of transporting a fingerprint attribute in the Session Description Protocol (SDP) that identifies the key that will be presented during the DTLS handshake. The key exchange travels along the media path as opposed to the signaling path. The SIP Identity mechanism can be used to protect the integrity of the fingerprint attribute from modification by intermediate proxies. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) extension to establish keys for Secure RTP (SRTP) and Secure RTP Control Protocol (SRTCP) flows. DTLS keying happens on the media path, independent of any out-of-band signalling channel present. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document specifies the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP). DTLS provides communications privacy for applications that use datagram transport protocols and allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery. DCCP is a transport protocol that provides a congestion-controlled unreliable datagram service. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document defines a new security precondition for the Session Description Protocol (SDP) precondition framework described in RFCs 3312 and 4032. A security precondition can be used to delay session establishment or modification until media stream security for a secure media stream has been negotiated successfully. [STANDARDS-TRACK]