cookies

DNS Cookies, as specified in RFC 7873, are a lightweight DNS transaction security mechanism that provide limited protection to DNS servers and clients against a variety of denial-of-service amplification, forgery, or cache-poisoning attacks by off-path attackers.

This document updates RFC 7873 with precise directions for creating Server Cookies so that an anycast server set including diverse implementations will interoperate with standard clients, with suggestions for constructing Client Cookies in a privacy-preserving fashion, and with suggestions on how to update a Server Secret. An IANA registry listing the methods and associated pseudorandom function suitable for creating DNS Server Cookies has been created with the method described in this document as the first and, as of the time of publication, only entry.

This document specifies version 1.0 of the Token Binding protocol. The Token Binding protocol allows client/server applications to create long-lived, uniquely identifiable TLS bindings spanning multiple TLS sessions and connections. Applications are then enabled to cryptographically bind security tokens to the TLS layer, preventing token export and replay attacks. To protect privacy, the Token Binding identifiers are only conveyed over TLS and can be reset by the user at any time.

This document specifies a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for the negotiation of Token Binding protocol version and key parameters. Negotiation of Token Binding in TLS 1.3 and later versions is beyond the scope of this document.

This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections.

We describe both first-party and federated scenarios. In a first- party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the security tokens that it issues to a client -- and that the client subsequently returns to the server -- to the TLS connection between the client and the server. Such bound security tokens are protected from misuse, since the server can generally detect if they are replayed inappropriately, e.g., over other TLS connections.

Federated Token Bindings, on the other hand, allow servers to cryptographically bind security tokens to a TLS connection that the client has with a different server than the one issuing the token.

This document is a companion document to "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0" (RFC 8471).

DNS Cookies are a lightweight DNS transaction security mechanism that provides limited protection to DNS servers and clients against a variety of increasingly common denial-of-service and amplification/ forgery or cache poisoning attacks by off-path attackers. DNS Cookies are tolerant of NAT, NAT-PT (Network Address Translation - Protocol Translation), and anycast and can be incrementally deployed. (Since DNS Cookies are only returned to the IP address from which they were originally received, they cannot be used to generally track Internet users.)

This memo defines a generic URI and HTTP-header-friendly envelope for carrying symmetrically encrypted, authenticated, and origin-timestamped tokens. It also describes one possible usage of such tokens via a simple protocol based on HTTP cookies.

Secure Cookie Session (SCS) use cases cover a wide spectrum of applications, ranging from distribution of authorized content via HTTP (e.g., with out-of-band signed URIs) to securing browser sessions with diskless embedded devices (e.g., Small Office, Home Office (SOHO) routers) or web servers with high availability or load- balancing requirements that may want to delegate the handling of the application state to clients instead of using shared storage or forced peering.

This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields. These header fields can be used by HTTP servers to store state (called cookies) at HTTP user agents, letting the servers maintain a stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol. Although cookies have many historical infelicities that degrade their security and privacy, the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields are widely used on the Internet. This document obsoletes RFC 2965. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes TCP SYN flooding attacks, which have been well-known to the community for several years. Various countermeasures against these attacks, and the trade-offs of each, are described. This document archives explanations of the attack and common defense techniques for the benefit of TCP implementers and administrators of TCP servers or networks, but does not make any standards-level recommendations. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This memo identifies specific uses of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) State Management protocol which are either (a) not recommended by the IETF, or (b) believed to be harmful, and discouraged. This memo also details additional privacy considerations which are not covered by the HTTP State Management protocol specification. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.

The purpose of this RFC is to focus discussion on authentication problems in the Internet and possible methods of solution. The proposed solutions this document are not intended as standards for the Internet at this time. Rather, it is hoped that a general consensus will emerge as to the appropriate solution to authentication problems, leading eventually to the adoption of standards. This document suggests mediated access-control and authentication procedures suitable for those cases when an association is to be set up between users belonging to different trust environments.