certificate transparency
Certificate transparency logs
certificate transparency RFCs (3)
RFC 9163: Expect-CT Extension for HTTP
Experimental- E. Stark
- June 2022
- IETF publication
- Web and Internet Transport
Abstract
This document defines a new HTTP header field named "Expect-CT", which allows web host operators to instruct user agents (UAs) to expect valid Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) to be served on connections to these hosts. Expect-CT allows web host operators to discover misconfigurations in their Certificate Transparency (CT) deployments. Further, web host operators can use Expect-CT to ensure that if a UA that supports Expect-CT accepts a misissued certificate, that certificate will be discoverable in Certificate Transparency logs.
Abstract
This document defines a new HTTP header field named "Expect-CT", which allows web host operators to instruct user agents (UAs) to expect valid Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) to be served on connections to these hosts. Expect-CT allows web host operators to discover misconfigurations in their Certificate Transparency (CT) deployments. Further, web host operators can use Expect-CT to ensure that if a UA that supports Expect-CT accepts a misissued certificate, that certificate will be discoverable in Certificate Transparency logs.
RFC 9162: Certificate Transparency Version 2.0
Experimental- B. Laurie
- E. Messeri
- R. Stradling
- December 2021
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.
This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts.
Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.
Abstract
This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.
This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts.
Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.
RFC 6962: Certificate Transparency
Experimental- B. Laurie
- A. Langley
- E. Kasper
- June 2013
- IETF publication
- General Area
Abstract
This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.
Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.
Obsoleted by RFC 9162
Abstract
This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.
Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.
Subscribe to certificate transparency
Get notified when:
- RFC changes to status, obsoleted by, updates, updated by, or subseries.
- New RFC added to this subject or below
- The subject was merged into another.