authorization

RFC 8519 defines a YANG data model for Access Control Lists (ACLs). This document specifies a set of extensions that fix many of the limitations of the ACL model as initially defined in RFC 8519. Specifically, it introduces augmentations to the ACL base model to enhance its functionality and applicability.

This document also creates initial versions of IANA-maintained modules for ICMP types and IPv6 extension headers.

This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.

The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS resource record (RR) provides a mechanism for domains to express the allowed set of Certification Authorities that are authorized to issue certificates for the domain. RFC 8659 contains the core CAA specification, where Property Tags that restrict the issuance of certificates that certify domain names are defined. This specification defines a Property Tag that grants authorization to Certification Authorities to issue certificates that contain the id-kp-emailProtection key purpose in the extendedKeyUsage extension and at least one rfc822Name value or otherName value of type id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox that includes the domain name in the subjectAltName extension.

When using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), address space holders need to issue Route Origin Authorization (ROA) object(s) to authorize one or more Autonomous Systems (ASes) to originate BGP routes to IP address prefix(es). This memo discusses operational problems that may arise from ROAs containing multiple IP prefixes and recommends that each ROA contain a single IP prefix.

The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) (RFC 5730) defines the use of authorization information to authorize a transfer of an EPP object, such as a domain name, between clients that are referred to as "registrars". Object-specific, password-based authorization information (see RFCs 5731 and 5733) is commonly used but raises issues related to the security, complexity, storage, and lifetime of authentication information. This document defines an operational practice, using the EPP RFCs, that leverages the use of strong random authorization information values that are short lived, not stored by the client, and stored by the server using a cryptographic hash that provides for secure authorization information that can safely be used for object transfers.

The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS record allows a domain to communicate an issuance policy to Certification Authorities (CAs) but only allows a domain to define a policy with CA-level granularity. However, the CAA specification (RFC 8659) also provides facilities for an extension to admit a more granular, CA-specific policy. This specification defines two such parameters: one allowing specific accounts of a CA to be identified by URIs and one allowing specific methods of domain control validation as defined by the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol to be required.

The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain name. CAA Resource Records allow a public CA to implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-issue. This document defines the syntax of the CAA record and rules for processing CAA records by CAs.

This document obsoletes RFC 6844.

This document defines a data model for Access Control Lists (ACLs). An ACL is a user-ordered set of rules used to configure the forwarding behavior in a device. Each rule is used to find a match on a packet and define actions that will be performed on the packet.

This document extends the Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) specification defined in RFC 8225 to allow the inclusion of cryptographically signed assertions of authorization for the values populated in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 'Resource-Priority' header field, which is used for communications resource prioritization.

The standardization of network configuration interfaces for use with the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) or the RESTCONF protocol requires a structured and secure operating environment that promotes human usability and multi-vendor interoperability. There is a need for standard mechanisms to restrict NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol access for particular users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. This document defines such an access control model.

This document obsoletes RFC 6536.

The basic design of the Domain Name System was completed almost 30 years ago. The last half of that period has been characterized by significant changes in requirements and expectations, some of which either require changes to how the DNS is used or can be accommodated only poorly or not at all. This document asks the question of whether it is time to either redesign and replace the DNS to match contemporary requirements and expectations (rather than continuing to try to design and implement incremental patches that are not fully satisfactory) or draw some clear lines about functionality that is not really needed or that should be performed in some other way.

In many environments, inheritable NFSv4 Access Control Entries (ACEs) can be rendered ineffective by the application of the per-process file mode creation mask (umask). This can be addressed by transmitting the umask and create mode as separate pieces of data, allowing the server to make more intelligent decisions about the permissions to set on new files. This document proposes a protocol extension to accomplish that.

This document describes a procedure for when a Military Message Handling System (MMHS) message is composed by one user and is only released to the mail transfer system when one or more Authorizing Users authorize release of the message by adding the MMHS-Authorizing-Users header field. The resulting message can be optionally signed by the sender and/or reviewer, allowing recipients to verify both the original signature (if any) and the review signatures.

This document specifies a Kerberos authorization data container that supersedes AD-KDC-ISSUED. It allows for multiple Message Authentication Codes (MACs) or signatures to authenticate the contained authorization data elements. The multiple MACs are needed to mitigate shortcomings in the existing AD-KDC-ISSUED container. This document updates RFC 4120.

In the past, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems have used very rigid policies that were implemented in particular protocols and platforms. As MAC systems become more widely deployed, additional flexibility in mechanism and policy will be required. While traditional trusted systems implemented Multi-Level Security (MLS) and integrity models, modern systems have expanded to include such technologies as type enforcement. Due to the wide range of policies and mechanisms that need to be accommodated, it is unlikely that the use of a single security label format and model will be viable.

To allow multiple MAC mechanisms and label formats to co-exist in a network, this document creates a registry of label format specifications. This registry contains label format identifiers and provides for the association of each such identifier with a corresponding extensive document outlining the exact syntax and use of the particular label format.

This document specifies the use of Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP) certificates as an authorization data type in the authorization extension for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. This is in accordance with the guidelines for authorization extensions as specified in RFC 5878. As with other TLS extensions, this authorization data can be included in the client and server hello messages to confirm that both parties support the desired authorization data types. If supported by both the client and the server, DTCP certificates are exchanged in the supplemental data TLS handshake message as specified in RFC 4680. This authorization data type extension is in support of devices containing DTCP certificates issued by the Digital Transmission Licensing Administrator (DTLA).

The Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) protocol binding for IEEE 802.11 defines two Medium Access Control (MAC) modes for IEEE 802.11 Wireless Transmission Points (WTPs): Split and Local MAC. In the Split MAC mode, the partitioning of encryption/decryption functions is not clearly defined. In the Split MAC mode description, IEEE 802.11 encryption is specified as located in either the Access Controller (AC) or the WTP, with no clear way for the AC to inform the WTP of where the encryption functionality should be located. This leads to interoperability issues, especially when the AC and WTP come from different vendors. To prevent interoperability issues, this specification defines an IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile message element in which each profile specifies an unambiguous division of encryption functionality between the WTP and AC.

Email on the Internet can be forged in a number of ways. In particular, existing protocols place no restriction on what a sending host can use as the "MAIL FROM" of a message or the domain given on the SMTP HELO/EHLO commands. This document describes version 1 of the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) protocol, whereby ADministrative Management Domains (ADMDs) can explicitly authorize the hosts that are allowed to use their domain names, and a receiving host can check such authorization.

This document obsoletes RFC 4408.

This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

Signaling layer protocols specified within the Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) framework may rely on the General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) protocol to handle authorization. Still, the signaling layer protocol above GIST itself may require separate authorization to be performed when a node receives a request for a certain kind of service or resources. This document presents a generic model and object formats for session authorization within the NSIS signaling layer protocols. The goal of session authorization is to allow the exchange of information between network elements in order to authorize the use of resources for a service and to coordinate actions between the signaling and transport planes. This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.

This document specifies the use of the KeyNote trust-management system as an authorization extension in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol, according to guidelines in RFC 5878. Extensions carried in the client and server hello messages confirm that both parties support the desired authorization data types. Then, if supported by both the client and the server, KeyNote credentials are exchanged in the supplemental data handshake message. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

This document specifies authorization extensions to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol. Extensions are carried in the client and server hello messages to confirm that both parties support the desired authorization data types. Then, if supported by both the client and the server, authorization information, such as attribute certificates (ACs) or Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) assertions, is exchanged in the supplemental data handshake message. This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.

This specification defines a profile for the use of X.509 Attribute Certificates in Internet Protocols. Attribute certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic applications requiring broad interoperability as well as limited special purpose requirements. The profile places emphasis on attribute certificate support for Internet electronic mail, IPsec, and WWW security applications. This document obsoletes RFC 3281. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Authorization is a key function in presence systems. Authorization policies, also known as authorization rules, specify what presence information can be given to which watchers, and when. This specification defines an Extensible Markup Language (XML) document format for expressing presence authorization rules. Such a document can be manipulated by clients using the XML Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP), although other techniques are permitted. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes a private Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) header field (P-header) to be used by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Telecommunications and Internet-converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networks (TISPAN) for the purpose of authorizing early media flows in Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) IP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS). This header field is useful in any SIP network that is interconnected with other SIP networks and needs to control the flow of media in the early dialog state. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document lays out a set of requirements related to trait-based authorization for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). While some authentication mechanisms are described in the base SIP specification, trait-based authorization provides information used to make policy decisions based on the attributes of a participant in a session. This approach provides a richer framework for authorization, as well as allows greater privacy for users of an identity system. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This specification defines the Target-Dialog header field for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), and the corresponding option tag, tdialog. This header field is used in requests that create SIP dialogs. It indicates to the recipient that the sender is aware of an existing dialog with the recipient, either because the sender is on the other side of that dialog, or because it has access to the dialog identifiers. The recipient can then authorize the request based on this awareness. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in TCP/IP-based internets. In particular, it defines objects for managing user identities and the names, addresses, and credentials required manage access control, for use with various protocols. This document was motivated by the need for the configuration of authorized user identities for the iSCSI protocol, but has been extended to be useful for other protocols that have similar requirements. It is important to note that this MIB module provides only the set of identities to be used within access lists; it is the responsibility of other MIB modules making use of this one to tie them to their own access lists or other authorization control methods. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document defines the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Proxy Authorization Control. The Proxy Authorization Control allows a client to request that an operation be processed under a provided authorization identity instead of under the current authorization identity associated with the connection. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

The Access Control List (ACL) extension (RFC 2086) of the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) permits mailbox access control lists to be retrieved and manipulated through the IMAP protocol.

This document is a revision of RFC 2086. It defines several new access control rights and clarifies which rights are required for different IMAP commands. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes policy, authorization, and enforcement requirements for the selection of the services to be applied to a given Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) flow. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document extends the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) bind operation with a mechanism for requesting and returning the authorization identity it establishes. Specifically, this document defines the Authorization Identity Request and Response controls for use with the Bind operation. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document specifies a set of methods, headers, message bodies, properties, and reports that define Access Control extensions to the WebDAV Distributed Authoring Protocol. This protocol permits a client to read and modify access control lists that instruct a server whether to allow or deny operations upon a resource (such as HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) method invocations) by a given principal. A lightweight representation of principals as Web resources supports integration of a wide range of user management repositories. Search operations allow discovery and manipulation of principals using human names. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes the representation of a session authorization policy element for supporting policy-based per-session authorization and admission control. The goal of session authorization is to allow the exchange of information between network elements in order to authorize the use of resources for a service and to co-ordinate actions between the signaling and transport planes. This document describes how a process on a system authorizes the reservation of resources by a host and then provides that host with a session authorization policy element which can be inserted into a resource reservation protocol (e.g., the Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) PATH message) to facilitate proper and secure reservation of those resources within the network. We describe the encoding of session authorization information as a policy element conforming to the format of a Policy Data object (RFC 2750) and provide details relating to operations, processing rules and error scenarios. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Establishing multimedia streams must take into account requirements for end-to-end QoS, authorization of network resource usage and accurate accounting for resources used. During session set up, policies may be enforced to ensure that the media streams being requested lie within the bounds of the service profile established for the requesting host. Similarly, when a host requests resources to provide a certain QoS for a packet flow, policies may be enforced to ensure that the required resources lie within the bounds of the resource profile established for the requesting host. To prevent fraud and to ensure accurate billing, this document describes various scenarios and mechanisms that provide the linkage required to verify that the resources being used to provide a requested QoS are in- line with the media streams requested (and authorized) for the session. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document describes the need for QoS and media authorization and

defines a SIP extension that can be used to integrate QoS admission

control with call signaling and help guard against denial of service

attacks. The use of this extension is only applicable in

administrative domains, or among federations of administrative

domains with previously agreed-upon policies, where both the SIP

proxy authorizing the QoS, and the policy control of the underlying

network providing the QoS belong to that administrative domain or

federation of domains.

This document describes the View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for use in the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) architecture. It defines the Elements of Procedure for controlling access to management information. This document also includes a Management Information Base (MIB) for remotely managing the configuration parameters for the View- based Access Control Model. This document obsoletes RFC 2575. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes the fundamental requirements of an access control list (ACL) model for the Lightweight Directory Application Protocol (LDAP) directory service. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This specification provides a simple challenge-response authentication protocol that is suitable for use with IMAP4. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This memo was developed from a deposition that I submitted as part of a challenge to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, part of the Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.